• Behmen says the goal was to "put up a fight for long enough to bring in the international community."
Kosovo: Examples of Evidence • Xhemajli: "We knew our attacks would not have any military value. Our goal was not to destroy the Serb military force [but to make it] become more vicious. . . . We thought it was essential to get international support to win the war."
• In May 1998 KLA official quoted saying intention is to "attract heavy Yugoslav barrages and thus win strong international sympathy, as the Croats did in Vukovar."
• Negotiator Gorani: "There was this foreign diplomat who once told me, 'Look unless you pass the quota of five thousand deaths you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo from the foreign diplomacy."
Cost-Sharing

Insurance Prescription Analogy for Intervention Prospects?
Deductible Violence threshold for intervention.
No. Insufficient to deter rebels.
Coinsurance
Inadequately protect rebels and civilians.
No. Not credible.
Cap Payout
Help civilians, not rebels. Maybe. But rebels and their goals will be aided.
Randomization
Insurance Prescription Analogy for Intervention Prospects?
Constructive Ambiguity Avoid clear criteria for intervention.
No. Already exists.
Hinder Lobbying by Insured UNSC monopoly on intervention.
No. States insist on right to intervene.
Regulation
Insurance Prescription Analogy for Intervention Prospects?
Ex-Ante No intervention if rebels provoke retaliation.
Maybe. But CNN effect creates pressure to intervene.
Ex-Post
Aid groups that end violence and reduce aims.
Maybe. But initial violence still rewarded.
Other Methods
Insurance Prescription
Analogy for Intervention Prospects?
Risk-Based Premiums Support non-violent groups rather than rebels.
Maybe. But political will lacking until violence.
Limited Guarantees
Cap contributions to a single intervener.
Mutual Liability
Vulnerable groups decide thirdparty intervention.
No. States won't delegate intervention decisions.
Proposed Reform of Humanitarian Intervention
No intervention on behalf of rebels unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate.
Expend substantial resources to persuade states to address the legitimate grievances of non-violent domestic groups, including golden parachutes for oppressive leaders who step down.
Do not coerce regime change or surrender of sovereignty without robust preventive military intervention to protect against violent backlash.
Deliver purely humanitarian aid -food, water, shelter, medical care -in ways that minimize benefit to rebels.
